Introduction
We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (cf. Hoel, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994) , with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. Rather, their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition. The transfer is paid in order to incentivize other agents to participate in a coalition that coordinates their members' actions to provide a public good, for example abatement of emissions. In the * We thank the editors, two reviewers, Stefan Ambec, Lorenzo Cerda Planas, Harold Houba, and Gerard van der Meijden, as well as seminar participants at CESifo, EAERE 2015 , FAERE 2015 , and SURED 2016 
